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A hedonic price function for Argentinean wines in the U.S market is estimated in order to 
evaluate the effect of the most important attributes of wine on price. Results show that 
labeling practices and the choice of the right wine quality attributes are far more 
influential on price than expert panel opinions or oenological wine improvements such as 
aging.  
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  1I.  Introduction 
Argentina is the fifth largest wine producer of the world with an annual production of 
15.4 million hectoliters. The country is placed after France (57.4 million hectoliters), 
Italy (53.0 million hectoliters), Spain (42.9 million hectoliters) and USA (20.1 million 
hectoliters) (OIV, 2004).  
Argentinean wine exports have been growing tremendously over the past decades,   
from US$ 15.2 million in 1990 to slightly above US$ 300 million in 2005, i.e. 1,900 % 
growth during that period (INV, 2006). During the same time span total trade grew at a 
significantly lower rate (251 %) (FAO, 2007), which allows to identify the wine industry 
as one of the sectors of the economy that contributes the most in positioning Argentina in 
the global economy. As recognition of the strategic importance of the wine industry for 
trade, the Argentinean Government established in 2004 the “Plan Estratégico Vitivinícola 
2020” (Wine Strategic Plan 2020) that aims at increasing the value of exports to the 
target figure of US$ 2,000 million by the year 2020. The industry is currently exporting 
to all five continents, but the most important markets for Argentinean wines are the 
United States of America (US$66.5 million, in 2006), the United Kingdom (US$30.4 
million), Canada (US$24.2 million), Brazil (US$24.6 million) and Denmark (US$15.5 
million) (Diario del Vino, 2008).  
Despite the strategic position of wine in the globalization of the economy of Argentina, 
no local or international research has been carried out to assess the value attached to 
Argentinean wine quality attributes in international markets. Indeed, this assessment can 
significantly contribute to design a marketing strategy for wines of this country and 
secure the commercial success. This research aims at filling this gap for the most 
important market for Argentinean wines: the U.S. market.  Thus, we estimate a hedonic 
price function for wine exports to the U.S. in order to gain insight into the implicit 
marginal valuation of each quality attribute. The selection of quality-relevant attributes is 
based on the literature review presented in the subsequent section. The methodological 
framework and the data are explored in section III before the results of the estimations are 
discussed in section IV. Finally, the last section presents the major conclusions and 
implications of our research.  
  2II.  Literature review 
The central idea in hedonic price theory, which goes back to the iconic paper by Rosen
1 
(1974), is that goods are valued in the markets for their utility-generating attributes. 
Hence, goods are thought of as composites from these attributes. Rosen suggests that 
competitive markets for these attributes define implicit prices for the relevant embodied 
product attributes, and consumers evaluate these attributes when they do a purchase. The 
observed market price is then equal to the sum of the implicit prices given to each quality 
characteristic. The method used in most of the scientific literature is a practical derivation 
of what Rosen proposed, but not exactly the same. The selection of all relevant quality 
attributes depends on the composite good in question. The existing literature on wine in 
general suggests several attributes, which can be grouped into characteristics which are 
under the control of the winery, and those, which are not, i.e, they are exogeneous factors 
for each winery.  
Among the latter characteristics, the influence of weather as a determinant of wine 
prices was analyzed by Ashenfelter et al. (1995), Di Vittorio and Ginsburgh (1995) and 
Wood and Anderson (2002), who identified an important role of weather conditions on 
the price determination, while Haeger and Storchmann (2006), working specifically with 
Pinot Noir, concluded that the most important wine price determinants are weather 
variables, temperature and rainfall specifically. Another possibly important attribute at 
the group level is the geographic origin, although the existing literature does not convey a 
uniform picture about the impact of differentiation by origin on the price. On the one 
hand, Nerlove (1995) found that the origin of wine has no significant influence on price, 
and Steiner (2004) found a low valuation of French wines with geographical appellation 
in United Kingdom. On the other hand, several authors found quite different results. 
Schamel (2000, 2004), Schamel and Anderson (2003) and Troncoso (2006) observed an 
important influence of the region of origin on price. Schamel and Anderson (2003) added 
that in Australia the regional reputations have become increasingly differentiated through 
time. In particular, cool climate regions are preferred to other regions. Steiner (2004) 
                                                 
1 Rosen was not the first author to work with hedonic regressions but his paper is an important and iconic 
contribution the theory of hedonic prices. 
  3concluded that the low valuation of French wines with geographical appellation might 
help to explain the overall decline of France’s role in the British wine market. 
Since the sensory quality of the wine can only be experienced after purchase in 
the course of consumption (Schamel and Anderson, 2003), wine is a typical experience 
good
2. Hence, reputation is one of the most important channels to help overcoming the 
informational asymmetry associated with experience goods. Reputation could be affected 
in two different ways. First, and probably at least partially under the control of the 
winery, reputation might be conveyed directly through the producer and/or brand name to 
consumers. In the literature, di Vittorio and Ginsburgh (1995), Schamel (2000), 
Oczkowski (2001) and Lecocq and Visser (2006) used this approach in the price 
regressions and found an important influence of this variable on price. Second, reputation 
rankings assigned by an expert, with respect we assume to be out of the direct control of 
the winery might play a role. E.g., Lima (2006) working with observations from 
American tasting events found that the San Francisco Fair appears to be the best predictor 
of quality with the Dallas Morning News tasting second best. Schamel (2004) concluded 
that quality awards have a significant and positive price impact. 
The positive influence of sensory qualities as judged by experts has been 
demonstrated by numerous authors, e.g., Nerlove (1995), Di Vittorio and Ginsburgh 
(1995), Combris et al. (1997), Schamel (2000 and 2004), Schamel and Anderson (2003), 
Haeger and Storchmann (2006), Lecocq and Visser (2006) and Troncoso (2006). The 
influence of some experts’ ratings on the price is so important that it has inspired a new 
term: Wine Parkerization. Wine Parkerization refers to the stylization of wines by some 
wineries to please the taste of the influential wine critic Robert M. Parker Jr. (Wikipedia, 
2007). However Combris et al. (1997), Lecocq and Visser (2001, 2006), Haeger and 
Storchmann (2006), and Troncoso (2006) have found that compared to the objectives 
characteristics of wine the influence of sensory qualities is relatively less important.   
Oczkowski (2001) went further and concluded that reputation effects have a significant 
influence on price while the influence of quality is insignificant. 
Among the variables under control of the winery, the quantity supplied is another 
attribute with potential explanatory power for the price. Di Vittorio and Ginsburgh (1995) 
                                                 
2 Some quality attributes like organic production etc. could also be viewed as credence goods. 
  4concluded that the price of a standard quantity of wine was negatively related to the 
quantity sold in the lot, while Lima (2006) found that the increased production of wine of 
a given quality will tend to lower the price. The impact of the quantity of wine produced 
is also proxied through the aging variable, because the scarcity of a particular wine 
increases with the time. The variable aging was generally found to have a positive impact 
on price (di Vittorio and Ginsburgh, 1995, Wood and Anderson, 2002, Troncoso, 2006). 
Di Vittorio and Ginsburgh (1995) estimated that aging increased wine prices by about 
3.7 % per year of age, while Troncoso (2006) puts the number at 5.6%.  
 
Finally, the impact of the chosen variety has found some attention in the literature. 
Troncoso (2006) estimated a positive impact of the grape variety on the purchase price 
while Steiner (2004) could not find a consistent pattern regarding the price impact of 
French varietal wines in the British market. 
 
III.  Data and methodology 
The data was obtained from the database of the digital version of the Wine Spectator 
magazine that contains ratings of thousands of wines from all over the world (Wine 
Spectator, 2006). The wines from Wine Spectator are blind-tasted by a panel of experts, 
following a very strict procedure to eliminate any subjective influence. The data was 
processed using the program R for statistical computing (R Development Core Team, 
2006). 
All the Argentinean wines were selected as possibly relevant in our context, 
resulting in 1,602 observations. However, this number was reduced to a final sample size 
of 1,102 observations, as outliers and observations with missing values were dropped. 
The sample contains wines from 1977 to 2005. For each observation the database 
provides the following variables: ‘retail price’, ‘sensory quality rating’, ‘quantity of cases 
made’, ‘vintage year’, ‘region of origin’, ‘producer name’, ‘special descriptors’ and 
‘grape variety’. The ‘score’ is provided as a sensory quality rating in a 100-point scale, 
according to the assessments made by the panel of experts of Wine. The variable ‘special 
descriptors’ refers to certain quality categories that appear on the label of a bottle of wine. 
These descriptors do not follow an internationally accepted classification system, but 
  5each winery uses its own categories, aiming at differentiating its wines from the 
competition. Four descriptors were identified in the sample, which are, in an ascending 
order of quality: ‘Selección’ (Selection), ‘Alta’ (High), ‘Reserva’ (Reserve) and ‘Gran 
Reserva’ (Gran Reserve). The variable ‘producer’ was used to identify the 38 main 
exporter wineries of Argentina, to capture a possible brand loyalty from the part of 
consumers. The remaining variables are self-explanatory. Prices were all expressed in 
constant 2005 US dollars per bottle, using the American CPI for food and beverages as 
deflator (USA Department of Labor, 2007). 
Six additional variables were defined based on the information in the database: 
‘Aging’, ‘Consignment available on the label’, ‘Membership to Wines of Argentina’, 
‘Level of regionalization’, ‘Producer’, ‘Instrumental 1’ and ‘Instrumental 2’.  
The variable ‘aging’ was estimated as the difference between the date of releasing 
the wine to the market and the vintage year. In the price regression, a squared term 
(‘Aging
2’) was included in order to allow for a non-linear effect of time on price over the 
wine life period.  
Some wine companies include information on the number of cases produced on 
the labels of their best wines. This information might have two different effects. On the 
one hand, the quantity of cases produced should be inversely related to price, as higher 
quantities placed in the market should depress the price. On the other hand, the mere 
existence of this information on the label might add reputation to a particular wine and, 
thus increase its price. To capture these effects, the information on the number of cases 
was used two construct two different variables, ‘consignment’, which is the actual 
number, and ‘consignment available’, which is a binary variable which indicates whether 
the information was included on the label or not. The first variable is intended to capture 
the quantity effect while the dummy variable proxies the reputation. 
‘Wines of Argentina’ is a private organization whose objective is the promotion 
of the generic brand “Wines of Argentina”. This organization is involved, jointly with the 
government, in carrying out the Wine Strategic Plan 2020 that aims at increasing the 
presence of Argentinean wine in world markets. Eventually, membership to this 
organization might enhance the reputation of the companies involved, so a variable 
(‘Club’) to capture this possible effect was included in the model.  
  6The producer region is presented in various forms on the label of a bottle. Two 
sets of dummies variables are related with this aspect. First, the ‘region of origin’ 
considers a set of dummies variables including the main wine provinces of Argentina 
(Mendoza, San Juan and Salta). And second, the variable ‘level of regionalization’ tries 
to capture through another set of dummies variables if while the more specific the origin 
of the wine, more the premium price that it receives. In the most common case, only the 
province of Argentina where the vineyard is located is mentioned, but there are also cases 
where the names of the valley and/or the vineyard appear on the label.  The latter case 
occurs when the company believes to have reached a certain status of differentiation in 
the market and claims (or attempts to claim) a price premium. Thus, the variable ‘level of 
regionalization’ was introduced to separate the possible price effect of specifying (or not) 
the valley, the district, the nearest town and the vineyard’s name, on the label. 
  An overview of the variable definitions in the model is shown in Table 1. 
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
The hedonic price regression is shown in equation (1). The dependent variable is the price 
per bottle in the U.S. market and the regressors are defined as outlined above. 
lnPUSA=α0+α1Score+α2Consignment+ α3ConsignmentA+ α4Aging+ α5Aging
2+α6Club 
+α7Region +α8Level+α9Producer+α10Descriptor+α11Variety+ε               (1) 
 
Although tasting experts follow a very strict procedure to be as objective as possible, the 
subjective influence can not be eliminated completely; so it is suspected that the ‘score’ 
or sensory quality rating might be measured with error, possibly introducing an 
endogeneity bias in equation (1). This suspicion could not be rejected when running a 
Hausman-type regression test
3 (Wooldridge, 2006). To avoid this problem and following 
Oczkowski (2001), a 2SLS estimation procedure was employed, using three additional 
variables, ‘vintage year’, ‘instrumental 1’ and ‘instrumental 2’ as instruments (equation 
2). The ‘instrumental 1’ variable was defined as the average score of all the wines of 
                                                 
3 The regression test was carried out in the following way: First, the independent and the instrumental variables, 
excepting the variables suspected of endogeneity, were regressed on score. Second, all the independent variables, 
including score, and the residuals from the first regression were regressed on the natural logarithm of the price. The 
residuals had a significant effect on price, confirming the endogeneous nature of score. For more information see 
Wooldridge (2006). 
  7older vintages and of the same vintage, but tasted before the observation under 
consideration. The latter variable (‘instrumental 2’) was defined as the average score of 
all the wines which belong to the same region of the wine in consideration, and that were 
tasted before this particular wine.   
 
Score=α0  +  α1Vintage + α2Instrumental1 + α3Instrumental2 + α4Consignment + 
α5ConsignmentA + α6Aging + α7Aging
2 + α8Club + α9Region + α10Level + α11Producer 
+ α12Descriptor + α13Variety + ε                                                                                     (2) 
 
 
The Breusch-Pagan test was carried out to detect heteroskedasticity. To avoid perfect 
multicollinearity between the dummy variables, a variable had to be omitted in each 
group of dummy variables
4. Hence, results should be interpreted as deviations against a 
bottle of Cabernet Sauvignon with no special descriptors from the province of Mendoza, 
produced by a vineyard that is member of “Wines of Argentina”. 
 
In log-linear functions the coefficient of a continuous variable is a derivative, that 
multiplied by 100 can be interpreted as the percentage change of the dependent variable 
due to a small change in the continuous variable (Halvorsen and Palmquist, 1980). In the 
case of dummy variables, their dichotomous nature impedes the interpretation of the 
coefficients as derivatives, but the impact can be estimated as proposed by Kennedy 
(1981). Thus: 






j   s dichotomou for  1 5 . 0 exp 100







   (2) 
where: 
•  pj: is the percentage impact of the j-th variable on price, and 
•  αj: is the estimated coefficient of the j-th variable 
•  var(αj): is the variance of the estimated coefficient of the j-th dummy variable. 
                                                 
4  Thus, all dummy coefficients have to be interpreted against the following references: Cabernet Sauvignon, for 
‘variety’; Mendoza, for ‘region of origin’; with the indication of the province, for ‘level of regionalization’; association 
of the vineyard to “Wines of Argentina”, for ‘club’ and absence of a particular descriptor, for ‘special descriptors’. 
  8Expression (2) allows the estimation of the marginal price of each variable. Thus, the 
marginal price of the j-th continuous and dummy variables, mj  is mj =pj*R, where R is 
the price of the reference wine. 
 
IV.  Discussion 
The sample includes wines priced from US$ 5.13 to US$ 150.05, with an average of 
US$ 17.24, per 750 ml bottle. Aging ranges from 0 to 24 years, with an average of 2.2 
years, and quality scores go from 64 to 96 points, with an average of 83.6. The average 
consignment was 12,363 cases, with a minimum of 18 cases and a maximum of 250,000 
cases. 
On average, a bottle of Cabernet Sauvignon with no special descriptors, from the 
province of Mendoza, produced by the ‘reference producer’, member of “Wines of 
Argentina”, has an age of about 2.2, a score of 86.8 points and is sold at a retail price of 
US$ 21.49 (reference wine). The average consignment is of 26,100 cases. 
Table 2 shows the regression results based on the 2SLS estimates. Diagnostic testing of 
the assumptions regarding the residuals indicates heteroskedasticity since the Breusch-
Pagan test statistic takes a value of 493.6. Therefore, heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors (HCSE) are reported in Table 2. The coefficient of determination shows 
that the variation of the regressors explains the 67.8 % of the variability in logarithmic 
retail prices. For all coefficients that are statistically different from zero at the 5% level, 
both the percentage impact and the corresponding standard error of the percentage impact 
are reported in the last two columns of Table 2. 
 
[Table 2 about here] 
 
The variables with the most important (positive or negative) impact on price are the 
‘grape variety’, the ‘level of regionalization’, the ‘name of the producer’, ‘aging’, and the 
‘special descriptors’. Quality ‘score’, ‘aging
2’, ‘consignment’ and ‘consignment 
available’, although statistically significant, have a relatively minor effect on price. 
‘Consignment’ shows, as expected, a negative relationship with price. Thus, one 
additional case placed in the market should depress price by 0.0005%, i.e. an increase of 
  910,000 cases is required to reduce price by 5%. Indeed, this makes sense in the huge 
American market. On the other hand, the simple fact of reporting the number of cases 
produced (‘Consignment A’) in the label is more significant, as it increases price by 9.1 
%. 
Figure 1 shows how the price of the reference wine changes with age. The 
reference wine reaches the maximum price (57.1 US$/bottle) with the age of 19 years. 
This figure clearly shows the quadratic relation the variable ‘Aging’. 
 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 
With regard to the region of origin, and the level of regionalization, there is no 
statistical significant price effect observed by indicating the region of origin, or by the 
indication of the valley or the nearest town. However, the designation of a district and the 
designation of a vineyard receive a statistically significant price premium of 13.0 %, and 
26.3 %, respectively. These results suggest that the American consumers do not 
distinguish between provinces in terms of the marginal valuation of Argentinean wine. 
Furthermore, they attach more value when the wine has a more specific location of origin 
on the label (i.e. designated vineyard).  
Surprisingly, membership to Wines of Argentina is negatively associated to price. 
This result is contrary to a priori expectations, as the generic promotion of Argentinean 
wines should have a positive effect on price. However, data collection for this study 
began in 2005, only a year after the generic promotion of Argentinean wines was 
launched, which might simply be too early to capture the desired improvements in retail 
prices. Also, this result might reflect the effort being made by Wines of Argentina’s 
associates to penetrate the American market, where reduced prices for wines of the 
association’s members might serve as an investment into future market opportunities. 
Such price reductions will naturally not be shared by those firms which are not associated 
with this organization. Additionally, there might be a free-riding problem in the sense that 
even non-member firms might benefit from promotion measures which focus on the 
geographic origin of the wines, Argentina at large. In particular in the early phase of 
setting up such a generic advertisement system, consumers are unlikely to discriminate 
  10arbitrary Argentinean Wines from those belonging to the label ‘Wines of Argentina’. 
Nevertheless, the lack of positive price effects of the club membership should be 
analyzed further after allowing some time for the promotion campaign to yield effects.   
In general, Table 2 shows that the retail price is quite sensitive to the variety, as 
practically all varieties exhibit two-digit positive or negative impacts. With the exception 
of “Tempranillo”, for red wines, and “Chardonnay”, for whites, varietal wines have 
negative coefficients; contrariwise, all blends have substantial positive price coefficients. 
These results are as expected since blending is a process of identifying and combining 
single varieties in terms of uniqueness and exquisiteness, traits that are presumably 
appreciated in the sophisticated wine market. It is noteworthy, however, that although 
blends with Malbec receive substantial price premia, the highest price differentials are 
attained by blends of Cabernet Sauvignon, combined with Malbec or other varieties. 
Although Malbec is the emblematic variety of Argentina, in the view of American 
consumers Argentinean oenologists do a better job when they include Cabernet 
Sauvignon in their blends. 
Table 2 shows that, with one exception, compared with the ‘reference producer’, 
the rest of significant Argentinean producers receive price discounts instead of price 
premia. 
Finally, price is also sensitive to special descriptors, as ‘Alta’ and ‘Gran Reserva’ 
receive a price premia of 39.7 % and 37.2 % respectively. However, while these 
descriptors have an important impact on price, the other two descriptors (‘Reserva’ and 
‘Selección’) were not significant, which means that we cannot reject the null that these 
descriptors have no impact on prices. This suggests that the insignificant descriptors have 
no meaning for the American consumers, or if there is a meaning associated with these 
two descriptors, consumers are not willing to pay price premia for them. Note also that 
this variable is correlated to variety, as it is unlikely that a varietal wine will deserve a 
high-quality descriptor, and a blend a low-quality descriptor.  
Table 3 reports the marginal prices for each characteristic. The major lesson to be 
drawn from the results is that labeling practices and the choice of the right wine quality 
attribute are far more influential on price than expert panel opinions or oenological wine 
improvements such as aging. Thus, a good label indicating the consignment (US$1.96), 
  11the vineyard of origin (US$5.65) and description of the quality (US$7.99 for a ‘Gran 
Reserva’) of the wine can add as much as US$ 15.6 to the retail price to the reference 
price of US$21.49 a bottle. On the other hand, producing a good blend can increase the 
retail price in the range of US$6.64 to 19.68 a bottle, as well as going for varietals can 
decrease price in as much as US$6.16. This contrasts with the US$ 1 to be gained by 
each additional score point or the US$3.27 for each additional year of aging, over the 
86.8 points and the 2.2 years of the reference wine, results difficult (and costly) to 
achieve.    
[Table 3 about here] 
V.  Conclusions 
In this study, the responsiveness of retail prices for Argentinean wines in the US market 
was analyzed by means of hedonic regression analysis. Our quantitative analysis of 
Argentinean wine exports to the US has indicated several ways along which better price 
positioning of Argentinean wines might be possible. Using a dataset compiled from Wine 
Spectator, we found that criteria like labeling, and choosing specific product 
characteristics which are immediately visible to the potential buyer, are key variables in 
the price determination. The impact of special descriptors on the label, however, was only 
substantial for half of the descriptors. Revision of the other descriptors should be 
considered since their use by the Argentinean wine industry seems not very well aligned 
with the internationally accepted descriptors. The retail price is also strongly affected by 
blends. The analysis suggests that the industry should prefer blends over varietals, 
especially those that include Malbec and Cabernet Sauvignon.  
  The finding of a negative impact of being a member in ‘Wines of Argentina’ was 
one of the most surprising results. The negative price differential is mainly connected to 
the fact that the generic advertisement campaign was only implemented in 2005 so that it 
is maybe too early to see a distinct impact in the target market. Future research will have 
to show whether this marketing program is helpful. However, due to the limitations of 
our study, this should not be viewed as a measure of the overall success of the program 
because this generic advertisement program is intended to increase the market share of 
Argentinean wine, which we cannot judge on the basis of our data.  
  12  Overall, the results of our analysis confirm that objective characteristics have a 
relatively stronger impact than subjective characteristics. The price of the experience 
good ‘wine from Argentina’ seems to be determined much more by the reputation which 
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  14I.  Figures and Tables 
Table 1: Description of the variables employed in the model 
Name  Identification 
name 
Objective  Type of 
variable 
Vintage Year  Vintage  Dummy 
Instrumental 1 
Instrumental 2 
Instrumental variables for the 
auxiliary regression  Continuous 
Sensory Quality Rating  Score 
Quantity of Cases Made  Consignment 
Continuous 





Membership to Wines of 
Argentina  
Club 
Region of Origin  Region 
Level of Regionalization  Level 
Producer Name  Producer 
Special Descriptors  Descriptor 
Varieties Variety 





Table 2: Results of the regression 











Constant  -1.116  0.355  -3.1  **       
Score 0.045  0.003  14.2  **  4.5  0.316 
Consignment -0.000005  0.000001  -7.1  **  -0.0005  0.0001 
Consignment available  0.091  0.028  3.2  **  9.1  2.828 
Aging 0.152  0.020  7.6  **  15.2  2.000 
Aging
2 -0.004 0.002  -2.0  **  -0.4  0.200 
Level of Regionalization 
Valley’s name  0.093  0.075  1.2          
District’s name  0.124 0.052  2.4  **  13.0  5.870 
Town’s name  0.059  0.088  0.7          
Vineyard’s name  0.235  0.059  4.0  **  26.3  7.464 
Membership to Wines of Argentina 
Membership   -0.151  0.065  -2.3  **  -14.2  5.555 
Region of Origin 
Salta  0.043  0.092  0.5          
San Juan  -0.138  0.087  -1.6          
Varieties 
Red Varieties 
Malbec  0.004  0.030  0.13          
Merlot  0.053  0.042  1.2          
Syrah -0.076  0.037  -2.0  **  -7.4  3.464 
Bonarda -0.333  0.096  -3.5  **  -28.7  6.828 
  15Tempranillo 0.198  0.091 2.2  **  21.4  10.971 
Sangiovese -0.128  0.067  -1.9  **  -12.2  5.882 
Pinot Noir  0.118  0.088  1.3          
Other Red Varietals  -0.331 0.089  -3.7  **  -28.5  6.385 
White Varieties 
Chardonnay 0.075  0.035  2.2  **  7.7  3.731 
Sauvignon Blanc  0.043  0.073  0.6          
Torrontés  -0.035  0.054  -0.6          
Viognier  0.018  0.077  0.2          
Other White Varietals  -0.216  0.065  -3.3  **  -19.6  5.205 
Blends 
Red Blends 
Only Malbec, Cabernet 
Sauvignon and Merlot 
0.289 0.098  2.9  **  32.9  13.054 
Only Malbec and Cabernet 
Sauvignon 
0.277 0.126  2.2  **  30.9  16.386 
Only Malbec and Syrah  -0.115  0.084  -1.4          
Only Cabernet Sauvignon 
and Syrah 
-0.026  0.145  -0.2          
Malbec, Cabernet 
Sauvignon, Merlot and 
other varieties 
0.672 0.210  3.2  **  91.6  39.701 
Malbec, Cabernet 
Sauvignon and other 
varieties (not Merlot) 
0.583 0.103  5.6  **  78.2  18.382 
Malbec and other varieties 
(not Cabernet Sauvignon, 
Merlot and Syrah) 
0.211  0.164  1.3          
Cabernet Sauvignon and 
other varieties (not Malbec, 
Merlot and Syrah) 
0.631 0.259  2.4  **  81.7  46.332 
White Blends 
Blends with Chardonnay 
(main variety) 
-0.048  0.074  -0.6          
Blends with Sauvignon 
Blanc (main variety) 
0.027  0.163  0.2          
Blends with Torrontés 
(main variety) 
-0.035  0.105  -0.3          
Producers 
Producer 1  0.557  0.149  3.7  **  72.6  25.633 
Producer 2  -0.205  0.104  -2.0  **  -19.0  8.398 
Producer 3  -0.317  0.128  -2.5  **  -27.8  9.241 
Producer 4  -0.380  0.085  -4.4  **  -31.9  5.811 
Producer 5  -0.185  0.150  -1.2          
Producer 6  -0.213  0.129  -1.6          
Producer 7  -0.622  0.110  -5.7  **  -46.6  5.828 
Producer 8  0.074  0.084  0.9          
Producer 9  -0.353  0.082  -4.3  **  -30.0  5.764 
Producer 10  -0.379  0.099  -3.8  **  -31.9  6.727 
  16Producer 11  -0.517  0.078  -6.6  **  -40.6  4.636 
Producer 12   -0.239  0.084  -2.9  **  -21.5  6.553 
Producer 13  -0.582  0.109  -5.3  **  -44.5  6.041 
Producer 14  -0.321  0.088  -3.6  **  -27.7  6.369 
Producer 15  -0.556  0.077  -7.2  **  -42.8  4.386 
Producer 16  -0.374  0.097  -3.8  **  -31.5  6.658 
Producer 17  -0.438  0.102  -4.3  **  -35.8  6.530 
Producer 18  -0.423  0.114  -3.7  **  -34.9  7.369 
Producer 19  -0.456  0.088  -5.2  **  -36.9  5.530 
Producer 20  -0.105  0.110  -1.0          
Producer 21  0.207  0.132  1.6          
Producer 22  -0.222  0.130  -1.7          
Producer 23  -0.185  0.096  -1.9          
Producer 24  0.068  0.162  0.4          
Producer 25  -0.357  0.073  -4.9  **  -30.2  5.121 
Producer 26  -0.401  0.102  -3.9  **  -33.4  6.808 
Producer 27  -0.689  0.133  -5.2  **  -50.2  6.574 
Producer 28  -0.169  0.101  -1.7          
Producer 29  -0.295  0.111  -2.7  **  -26.0  8.181 
Producer 30  -0.130  0.149  -0.9          
Producer 31  -0.199  0.103  -1.9          
Producer 32  -0.097  0.155  -0.6          
Producer 33  -0.217  0.082  -2.7  **  -19.8  6.556 
Producer 34  -0.494  0.096  -5.1  **  -39.3  5.843 
Producer 35  0.229  0.163  1.4          
Producer 36  -0.487  0.091  -5.4  **  -38.8  5.530 
Producer 37  -0.346  0.082  -4.2  **  -29.5  5.762 
Producer 38  -0.667  0.124  -5.4  **  -49.1  6.316 
Special Descriptors 
Alta    0.339  0.097  3.5  **  39.7  13.512 
Reserva  0.027  0.037  0.7          
Gran Reserva  0.324  0.125  2.6  **  37.2  17.122 
Selection  -0.076  0.099  -0.8          
R
2 =  0.678 
RSE =  0.3344 
 































Table 3: Marginal prices for the significant variables in USA 









Level of Regionalization 
District’s name  2.80 
Vineyard’s name  5.65 
Membership to Wines of Argentina 















Only Malbec, Cabernet  7.06 
  18Sauvignon and Merlot 








Sauvignon and other 
varieties (not Merlot) 
16.80 
Cabernet Sauvignon 
and other varieties (not 




Producer 1  15.60 
Producer 2  -4.08 
Producer 3  -5.97 
Producer 4  -6.85 
Producer 7  -10.02 
Producer 9  -6.44 
Producer 10  -6.85 
Producer 11  -8.71 
Producer 12   -4.63 
Producer 13  -9.55 
Producer 14  -5.96 
Producer 15  -9.20 
Producer 16  -6.78 
Producer 17  -7.69 
Producer 18  -7.50 
Producer 19  -7.92 
Producer 23  -3.71 
Producer 25  -6.49 
Producer 26  -7.17 
Producer 27  -10.79 
Producer 29  -5.59 
Producer 31  -3.97 
Producer 33  -4.25 
Producer 34  -8.44 
Producer 36  -8.34 
Producer 37  -6.34 
Producer 38  -10.55 
Special Descriptors 
Alta    8.53 
Gran Reserva  7.99 
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